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Abstract
This paper defends revealed preference theory against a pervasive line of criti-
cism, according to which revealed preference methodology relies on appealing to some
mental states, in particular an agent’s beliefs, rendering the project incoherent or un-
motivated. I argue that all that is established by these arguments is that revealed
preference theorists must accept a limited mentalism in their account of the options
an agent is modelled as choosing between. This is consistent both with an essen-
tially behavioural interpretation of preference and with standard revealed preference
methodology, and does not undermine the core motivations of revealed preference
theory.
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1 Introduction
The theory of rational choice that is at the heart of much of orthodox economics is formu-
lated in terms of preferences. Economic models in most of microeconomics, as well as much
of macroeconomics typically describe agents as expected utility maximizers. Methods for
the empirical measurement of demand functions, the rate of inflation, and other impor-
tant economic variables presuppose that agents are expected utility maximizers. What
this has standardly been taken to mean, since about the middle of the 20th century, is
that agents have preferences which fulfil various conditions, making it the case that they
can be represented as expected utility maximizing.
This paper is concerned with the cluster of views commonly referred to as ‘revealed
preference theory’. At the core of revealed preference theory as I will understand and
defend it in the following is a claim about the interpretation of ‘preference’ in standard
economic theory – both when it is applied in economic modelling, as well as, and especially,
in empirical estimation and measurement. Revealed preference theorists are committed
to a behavioural understanding of preference, whereby they equate preference with actual
or hypothetical choice behaviour.1 According to that understanding, when an economist
ascribes a preference for an option a over an option b to an agent (be it a real or a model
agent), this is meant to capture nothing more than that the agent does or would choose a
over b from some specified choice set – for instance, that she does or would choose a over
b when only those two options are available, or that she does or would not choose b in any
choice situation where both are available.2 The behavioural interpretation of preference
gives a technical meaning to preferences as they appear in standard economic theory, which
consciously departs from the everyday understanding of preference as conative mental
attitude.3
Apart from a general commitment to the behavioural understanding of preference
in economic theory, revealed preference theory is characterized by a methodological pro-
gramme that aims to (i) use past choice data to ascribe preferences and utilities to agents,
(ii) use these preference and utility ascriptions to make predictions about unobserved
choices, and (iii) lay the formal foundations for the mapping of choice behaviour to pref-
1This view is very widespread in economics. See, for instance, Savage (1972), Luce and Raiffa (1957),
Harsanyi (1977), Mas-Colell et al. (1995), Binmore (2008), Gul and Pesendorfer (2008) and Gilboa (2009).
For a defence in the philosophical literature, see Maher (1993).
2I will not take a stance here on which of these behavioural interpretations should be adopted. A
potential problem with the first is that it is not clear whether it allows us to express indifference. A
potential problem with the second is that it conceptually rules out various violations of standard expected
utility theory.
3Note that according to this understanding of the behavioural interpretation of preference, if what an
agent actually or hypothetically chooses when confronted with a particular choice set is not stable over
time, then the agent does not have stable preferences – it is not the case that she fails to have preferences
at all, or that she chooses counter-preferentially.
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erence. Under a behavioural interpretation of preference, no inference about conative
mental states (preference in the ordinary sense) is made when going from observation of
choice behaviour to preference and back to a prediction about choice. On the face of it, we
are merely making predictions about future choice on the basis of past choice, under the
assumption that various consistency conditions hold, with preference and utility assign-
ments serving as a useful shorthand. Revealed preference theorists have thus taken this
methodology to be more inductively safe, to find more general application than methods
that make more explicit appeal to mental states, and to allow greater separation from the
psychological sciences. These alleged advantages depend on the behavioural interpreta-
tion of preference, and the behavioural interpretation is in turn bolstered by success of
the methodology (if, indeed, it is successful).
Insofar as it is committed to a behavioural understanding of preference, revealed pref-
erence theory is widely rejected in the philosophical literature.4 It is frequently associated
with long discredited forms of behaviourism and positivism. Recently, Clarke (2016) has
shown persuasively that the behavioural interpretation of preference as it features in eco-
nomic models, or what he calls the ‘shorthand view’ does not imply any problematic
behaviourist or positivist thesis. And he and others have provided compelling arguments
to favour a behavioural interpretation, or at least to move away from the interpretation of
preference as mental state usually proposed as an alternative.5 But one line of criticism
of revealed preference theory, brought forward most forcefully by Hausman (2000), has
proven especially sticky. According to this line of criticism, the empirical success of re-
vealed preference methodology in fact ultimately relies on appealing to some mental states,
in particular the agent’s beliefs, and her own conception of the options open to her. This
is then either taken to show that revealed preference theory is incoherent, or at the very
least that it is unmotivated. Alternative interpretations of preference, usually as a kind
of mental state, are proposed instead. Even Guala (2019), who rejects the interpretation
of preference as mental state, and whose argument I am largely sympathetic with, is per-
suaded by this line of argument to reject the revealed preference theorist’s identification of
preference and choice, and interpret preferences as belief-dependent dispositions instead.
Against this line of argument, this paper shows that a charitable interpretation of
revealed preference theory, which preserves the identification of choice and preference,
is possible, and faithful to economic practice.6 Despite the popularity of the argument,
a close analysis of exactly how revealed preference theorists must appeal to beliefs, and
where this leaves the identification of preference and choice and the revealed preference
theorist’s methodological programme is in fact still wanting. And this is what I aim to
4See, in particular, Rosenberg (1992), Hausman (2000, 2012), Craver and Alexandrova (2008), Dietrich
and List (2016), Bradley (2017), and Guala (2019).
5See, e.g., Angner (ming) and Guala (2019). I provide a further argument in Thoma (2020).
6Note that my argument will be limited to what is commonly referred to as ‘positive’ economics, and
bracket the question of welfare and its relation to preference.
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provide here. I will conclude that revealed preference theorists need to concede only a
minimal kind of mentalism, which leaves the identification of preference and choice, and
thus, I will argue, the behavioural interpretation of preference, untouched. The root of the
critics’ concern is that revealed preference theory is only empirically successful if we can
attribute to the agents we wish to study preference relations that are generally consistent
in the way the theory requires, and generally stable over time. This paper will concede
that revealed preference theory can only hope to be empirically successful in this way if
agents’ options – the objects of both preference and choice – are described in a way that is
consistent with how they present themselves to them. Getting the description of options
right will thus often involve making assumptions about agents’ beliefs. However, I will
argue that this only amounts to mentalism in our theory of options, and a limited kind of
mentalism at that. Such mentalism is consistent both with the behavioural interpretation
of preference and with standard revealed preference methodology. In fact, I will provide
evidence that current economic practice is by and large consistent with the concession of
a limited kind of mentalism about options.
Moreover, I argue that combining a behavioural interpretation of preference with a
limited mentalism about options does not undermine the core motivations its proponents
have cited in favour of revealed preference theory: Revealed preference theory still largely
black-boxes the psychological processes that lead to choice, and thereby achieves greater
generality, avoids controversial substantive commitments about psychological processes
we know little about, and preserves clearer disciplinary boundaries than expected utility
theory would under more mentalistic interpretations of preference. In addition, revealed
preference theory still eliminates several problematic inductive steps in the measurement of
economic variables and prediction of economic choice behaviour, in particular the inductive
steps from choice to mentalistic preference and vice versa.
Revealed preference theory should thus not be as quickly dismissed as it often is
in the philosophical literature. Its core methodological commitment to the identification
of preference and choice, the motivations commonly cited in favour of it, and economic
practice are coherent with each other, and not undermined by the observation that mental
states must have some role to play in revealed preference theory. There may, of course, be
other reasons to reject revealed preference theory, and a fuller defence of the view must
be provided elsewhere.7 However, I believe my argument removes the need for those who,
like Guala, reject mentalism, to distance themselves from revealed preference theory. And
it shows one of the core arguments often cited in favour of mentalism to be unsound.
7The arguments against mentalism cited in footnote 5 above, I believe, make a strong case in combi-
nation with my argument here.
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2 Revealed Preference Theory
Before evaluating the adequacy of revealed preference theory, it is important to get a sense
of how preferences feature in economic methodology. First, preferences feature heavily in
models of individual choice. As mentioned in the introduction, the standard economic
model of individual choice describes agents as expected utility maximizers. Various repre-
sentation theorems provide ‘axiomatizations’ of expected utility theory, showing that an
agent’s preferences can be represented as expected utility maximizing in the framework
proposed if and only if they abide by a number of axioms. The representation theorem
most commonly appealed to in economics goes back to von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944). Most importantly, von Neumann and Morgenstern require agents to have com-
plete and transitive preferences over outcomes and lotteries (probability distributions over
outcomes), and for these preferences to abide by the independence axiom. Von Neumann
and Morgenstern’s representation theorem assumes probabilities over outcomes to be given
(hence this is often called ‘objective’ expected utility theory), and shows that if and only
if an agent’s preferences abide by the axioms will there be some utility function over out-
comes such that the agent prefers one lottery over another if and only if the expectation
of utility associated with that lottery is higher. In contexts where probabilities cannot
plausibly be assumed to be given, Savage’s (1954) representation theorem for ‘subjective’
expected utility theory is usually invoked, since it allows us to also assign probabilities to
the agent.
Since the rise to prominence of these representation theorems, economists have typi-
cally viewed utility as nothing more than a convenient device for representing an agent’s
preferences – cutting ties with the more substantive roots of the concept as a psychologi-
cally real quantity, such as happiness, going back to 19th century British moral philosophy.
Revealed preference theory goes one step further in cutting ties with these mentalistic ori-
gins of utility theory by interpreting preference itself not as a mental attitude distinct from
the choice patterns to which it gives rise, but rather equating it with the choice patterns
themselves.
The possibility of an understanding of preference that reduces to choice is established
by a further group of representation theorems, which show that if and only if an agent’s
choices over sets of options (including non-binary ones) abide by various consistency con-
ditions can they be represented as optimizing according to some binary relation R which is
complete and transitive over all options. Building on work by Samuelson (1938), this was
first proven by Houthakker (1950), who introduced what is now known as the ‘Strong Ax-
iom of Revealed Preference’.8 Under uncertainty, additional axioms guarantee consistency
8The revealed preference theorem most commonly appealed to today is due to Afriat (1967), which
employs the ‘Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference’.
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with expected utility maximization, within the objective and subjective framework.9 The
revealed preference theorist goes on to call R the preference relation: Preference is what-
ever binary relation conveniently represents the agent’s choices in the way captured by the
theorems – just as utility is standardly interpreted to be just whatever conveniently rep-
resents preferences. As is generally acknowledged, the theorems do not prove that choices
reveal preferences in the ordinary sense of preference, as conative attitude. They merely
show that we can define a technical notion of preference that reduces to choice, which
may or may not track ordinary preference. Revealed preference theorists claim that when
expected utility theory is applied in positive economics, preference should be understood
in the technical way.10
While these representation theorems are an exercise in pure theory, they form the
basis for empirical methods that allow for the estimation of individual demand functions
(relating the quantities purchased of some good to its price) and Engel curves (relating
the quantities purchased of some good to income level) from a limited set of observations
of purchasing decisions at different price points and income levels.11 Economists can use
these methods to describe and explain the choices of real individuals they have observed
as expected utility maximizing, and to make predictions of future and yet unobserved
choices. In addition to the assumption that an agent’s actual and hypothetical choices at
any one point in time obey by the axioms of the representation theorems, these methods
rely on the assumption that an agent’s choice behaviours remain stable over time.12
Revealed preference theory, as I understand it here, is committed to the empirical
9See Green and Srivastava (1986) for a revealed preference theorem in the objective framework, and
Chambers and Echenique (2016), Chapter 8 for an overview of revealed preference theory under uncertainty.
Though these find less application in practice, there are also revealed preference theorems for game theory,
establishing the representability of joint choice functions by standard solution concepts. See Chambers
and Echenique (2016), Chapter 10.
10Bernheim and Rangel (2008: 158), provide an especially clear statement of this position: “Though
we often speak as if choices are derived from preferences, the opposite is actually the case. Standard
economics makes no assumptions about how choices are actually made; preferences are merely constructs
that summarize choices. Accordingly, meaningful assumptions pertain to choices, not to preferences.
Though the terminology suggests a model of decision making in which preferences drive choices, it is
important to remember that the standard framework does not embrace that suggestion; instead, R is
simply a summary of what the individual chooses in a wide range of situations.” (as also cited in Hands
2013)
11See, in particular, Afriat (1973) and Varian (1982).
12This assumption is sometimes treated as part of the behavioural interpretation of preference. See, for
instance, Bermudez (2009). I want to resist this, since it would imply that agents whose choice behaviour
is not stable over time fail to have preferences, making all of expected utility theory inapplicable to them.
However, this would be throwing the baby out with the bath water. Such agents’ actual and hypothetical
choices can still abide by the axioms at any one point in time, and indeed they can exhibit stable choice
behaviour for the most part, over long stretches of time. Treating stability of choice behaviour not as
part of the definition of preference, but as an additional assumption of the revealed preference approach
implies that instabilities of choice behaviour make prediction of agents’ choices with revealed preference
methodology fallible, rather than in principle inapplicable.
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methodology just described for (i) imputing preferences and utility and demand functions
from choice data, and (ii) using these to make predictions about unobserved choice be-
haviour and economic phenomena, based on the (iii) formal foundations laid by the repre-
sentation theorems for mapping choices to preferences. Commitment to this methodology
is coupled with the conceptual claim that preferences are to be understood behaviourally,
as mere convenient descriptions of an agent’s choice behaviour. Some central motivations
for advocating this package are canvassed in Section 6 below. Note that while revealed
preference theorists push for the centrality of their methodology in empirical economics,
they of course acknowledge that there is more to economics than this methodology. And
they typically take their conceptual claim, the behavioural interpretation of preference, to
extend beyond parts of economics that use this empirical methodology. Indeed, we can
also extend it to more theoretical parts of economics.
Models in theoretical economics typically posit some expected utility maximizing
agents, often with simple utility functions sensitive only to the agent’s own profits or some
combination of the agent’s own wealth, consumption or leisure. Unlike in more empirical
parts of economics, the assumption of expected utility maximization is not applied to
real agents in the economy, but to theoretical entities that play a certain role in models,
and that do not have a clear and definite analogue in the real economy. Akerlof’s (1970)
famous model of a market for used cars, for instance, features two types of traders of used
cars, both of which are portrayed as expected utility maximizers whose utility functions
are sensitive only to wealth levels and some measure of the quality of any cars they own.
These groups of traders are not plausibly understood to be direct representations of any
real used car traders.
Exactly how and what we are supposed to learn from such theoretical models about
the economy is a matter of dispute within philosophy of economics. I agree here with, e.g.,
Sugden (2000, 2009) and Gilboa et al. (2014) at least in what these models are trying to
offer: Illustrations of a general type of mechanism that is instantiated in many different
ways in different economic settings. Insofar as there are relevant similarities between the
model and some economic setting or phenomenon, we are licensed to draw some inferences
from the model. This is supposed to be possible even if the agents featuring in the model
are not direct analogues of any particular real world agents. The conceptual claim of
revealed preference theory, that preferences are to be understood as actual or hypothetical
choices, applies to such theoretical models, too. According to this claim, positing expected
utility maximizing agents in theoretical economic models amounts to positing theoretical
entities that choose in a certain way. It does not amount to positing theoretical entities
whose choices are caused by some internal state in a specific way. And so, whatever else we
might infer from them, theoretical economic models featuring expected utility maximizing
agents never license inferences about the mental causes of the choices of real agents.
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3 The Anti-Behaviourist Challenge to Revealed Preference
Theory
Revealed preference theory is often described as an outgrowth of an outdated and dis-
credited positivist philosophy of science, characterized by a general unwillingness to posit
unobservable entities, in particular mental states.13 It is now generally acknowledged
that no science can make progress without positing unobservable entities. Psychology, in
particular, has largely abandoned behaviourism, the view that banished appeal to unob-
servable mental states in favour of analysis in terms of patterns of observable behaviour.
Since positivism and behaviourism are untenable, it is argued, revealed preference theory
must also be.
Clarke (2016) shows convincingly that the identification of preference and patterns of
choice can be isolated from, and can be motivated independently of discredited positivist
and behaviourist theses. Identifying preference and choice does not, for instance, thereby
commit one to the idea that the aim of science in general is to explain the observable
in terms of the observable, that choice can be observed in a theory-independent way, or
to the idea that choice data is the only kind of data admissible in economics. As will
become clear in the following, empirical revealed preference methodology also does not
commit economists to these positivist theses. However, there is one particularly sticky
issue not addressed by Clarke, that has kept even those otherwise sympathetic, such as
Guala (2019), from endorsing a behavioural interpretation of preference. And that is
the idea that preference attribution is always inextricably linked to the attribution of
mental states, in particular beliefs, and that this makes revealed preference theory either
incoherent or unmotivated.14
Consider the following example. Suppose an economist and her friend visit a sushi
restaurant for the first time. The economist has read about wasabi being very spicy
and knows what it looks like. Her friend mistakes it for avocado and devours a whole
spoonful. If the economist models her friend’s choice options as “eating a spoonful of
wasabi” and “not doing that”, then as a revealed preference theorist, she will conclude
that her friend prefers “eating a spoonful of wasabi” to “not doing that”. As a revealed
preference theorist, she may predict her friend will choose in the same way on future
occasions. After all, as we have seen above, expected utility theory is committed to
the claim that agents have preferences that are consistent in the way described by the
standard axioms, and application of empirical revealed preference methodology used to
impute demand functions requires an assumption that agents’ preferences are stable over
13See, for instance, Rosenberg (1992), Hausman (2000, 2012), Craver and Alexandrova (2008), Dietrich
and List (2016), Bradley (2017).
14See, in particular Hausman (2000, 2012) on this.
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time. However, unless her friend has very unusual tastes, the economist will inevitably
find that her prediction turns out false, and the revealed preference approach will have
failed her.
The problem here clearly is that we have somehow not taken proper account of the
fact that the economist’s friend initially has a false belief about the option in front of her.
Critics have concluded from this kind of case that preference should not be identified with
choice: The agent chooses wasabi (due to a false belief), but does not prefer it. However,
I take it that a natural reaction by an economist to this case would be that the decision
problem has been misspecified, already at the level of the description of choice. That is, the
agent should not be described as choosing wasabi. For one, misspecification of the objects
of choice is the right diagnosis in a related class of cases. Take, for instance, the following
variations of our case: Suppose the economist describes her friend’s options in very general
terms as simply “eating food” and “not eating food”. Or suppose she is specific only in
ways that capture only the superficial qualities of the options, for instance by describing
her friend as choosing between “eating a thick green paste” and “not eating it”. In both
cases, she would again be unlikely to uncover a consistent and stable preference relation
when she further observes her friend: She may observe her friend choosing to eat other
food just moments later, and she may observe her eating a thick green paste with her
tortilla chips just the next day.
In these two cases, I think it is uncontroversial that the objects of choice have been
misspecified. If revealed preference methodology is to be empirically adequate, which
requires the identification of a stable and consistent preference relation, then it must abide
by some standard for the specification of an agent’s options that will yield this verdict. I
want to argue that revealed preference theorists should deal with the first case, involving
false beliefs, in just the same way: By providing standards for the specification of choice
options that help economists avoid the problem. As we will see in the next section, these
will allow economists to retain the identification of preference and choice.
Even if critics were willing to go along with identifying the problem at the level
of description of the objects of choice already, they may go on to argue that any ade-
quate standard of option specification will have to make some reference to agents’ mental
states. And so a general kind of behaviourism, which disallows any reference to mental
states, or even behaviourism constrained to revealed preference methodology, is untenable
for revealed preference theorists. Let me sketch this argument applied to the cases just
described.
To start with the first case, as just mentioned, the economist’s mistake in describing
her friend as choosing whether or not to eat wasabi would be that she did not correctly
take into account what her friend does or does not know about her options. Her friend does
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not know that the paste in front of her is wasabi. She might not even know what wasabi
is, and that it is very spicy. It seems like, to avoid the above mistake, the economist
must acknowledge in the description of options that her friend mistakenly thought the
wasabi was something more delectable. Otherwise she will not be able to uncover a
consistent and stable relation when observing her friend’s future choice behaviour. Indeed,
if the economist knew about her friend’s mistaken beliefs, applying revealed preference
methodology in the way described in the first scenario would be silly. Of course, the
economist may not know about her friend’s mistaken beliefs, in which case the misspecified
decision problem may be her best attempt at uncovering a stable and consistent preference
relation. But all this shows is that the revealed preference methodology is fallible whenever
knowledge of agents’ beliefs is imperfect. In any case, the success of revealed preference
methodology relies on getting the agent’s beliefs right.
In the second and third case, the economist does come up with a description of the
options that is at least consistent with her friend’s beliefs about her options. After all, her
friend very likely does believe the wasabi to be food, and she very likely does believe it to
be a thick green paste. Here, the problem seems to be that the economist has not described
the options in a way that captures everything relevant to her friend’s choice. Again, we
might think that, in order to capture everything that is relevant in the appropriate sense,
we have to consider the agent’s mental states. We might, for instance, think that the
economist should include in the description of the options all the features of the options
that the agent finds desirable, such as the thick green paste’s taste.15 Or we might think
that the economist should try to describe options in the way and at the level of detail
that the agent herself conceives of them.16 Either way, the economist appeals to further
mental states, such as desires and mental representations of options.
If this analysis is correct, a general or even local kind of behaviourism is untenable
for revealed preference theorists. There are two kinds of conclusions critics of revealed
preference have drawn from this. First, if we define revealed preference theory in such a
way that it is committed to strict behaviourism about revealed preference methodology,
revealed preference theory appears to turn out incoherent: It must endorse a mentalistic
theory of option specification while being committed to a behaviourism that should include
one’s theory of options.17 Second, even if revealed preference theory is not taken to be
committed to strict behaviourism by definition, revealed preference theory allegedly loses
its core motivation if it must concede appeal to some mental states.18
15Pettit (1991: 165), for instance, argues that two outcomes (or, in the standard economic case, consump-
tion bundles) should be distinguished from each other just in case they differ in terms of some property
that is desired or undesired by the agent.
16We find this proposal, for instance, in Bradley (2017: 60).
17The argument in Hausman (2012: 28), for instance, relies on taking revealed preference theory to be
committed to the view that preferences can be inferred from choices “regardless of belief”.
18See, for instance, Bradley (2017: 60), Dietrich and List (2016).
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The next sections aim to establish that it is uncharitable to define revealed preference
theory in such a way that it is committed to behaviourism of a kind that forbids any
mentalism in one’s theory of options. Examples such as the ones just discussed do show
that revealed preference theorists must adopt a kind of mentalism in their theory of what
the options are that agents are choosing between – though the mentalism about options
that must be conceded is more limited than critics claim. But this does not undermine
the core conceptual commitment of revealed preference theory, namely the behavioural
interpretation of preference. In fact, I will argue that the concession of a limited kind of
mentalism about options is by and large consistent with economic practice, and does not
render revealed preference theory unmotivated.
4 Mentalism about Options
The representation theorems for expected utility theory, and generally any application of
the theory, start with some model of a decision situation. Von Neumann and Morgen-
stern’s representation theorem assumes that agents have preferences over outcomes and/or
lotteries. Savage has agents have preferences over assignments of outcomes to states of
the world. The revealed preference theorems do not start with ascriptions of preferences,
but with ascriptions of choices. Depending on the framework, these choices again have as
their object outcomes, lotteries, or assignments of outcomes to states of the world. Before
we can apply economic theory to a real world choice situation, we thus have to describe
the choice situation in those terms. Here, there is room for mistake, and economists need
some standards for the specification of the objects of preference and choice. My proposal
is that revealed preference theorists should apply standards that help them in their core
methodological programme, that of describing agents’ choice behaviour with consistent
preference relations, and using those to make predictions of future choice behaviour.
I can find no evidence that economists apply different standards for the specifica-
tion of the objects of choice and the objects of preference – which would rule out the
identification of preference and choice. For one, they use the terms ‘options’, ‘outcomes’,
‘lotteries’ etc. in both cases. Indeed, there seems to be no reason for revealed preference
theorists to concede that the objects of choice and the objects of preference should be
described differently if there are workable standards for the description of choice options
that address the problems discussed in the last section, allow them to retain the identifi-
cation of preference and choice, and more generally work for their core empirical project.
I here present standards that I think fit the bill, and that are, moreover, consistent with
economic practice.
For there to be a hope of uncovering a stable and consistent preference relation in the
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way the revealed preference approach aims to do, the standards for the specification of
agents’ choice options must help revealed preference theorists avoid the kinds of mistakes
discussed in the last section, at least in cases where economists are in the right epistemic
situation to avoid them. I want to suggest the following standards for the specification of
an agent’s choice options in the ideal circumstances where we have full knowledge of the
agent’s hypothetical choice behaviours and beliefs:
1. The description of options should be consistent with the agent’s beliefs about the
nature and consequences of the actions open to her, provided the agent’s relevant
beliefs are mutually consistent.19
2. A perceived feature of a choice situation should be included in the description of
the agent’s options whenever that feature affects the agent’s choice behaviour, that
is, when there are choice situations where the agent would make a different choice
when she believes that feature is present or absent respectively.20
Describing options in this way does not guarantee that standard revealed preference theory
will be able to capture every agent’s choice behaviour and make correct predictions using
the standard methodology. Even if we describe options in this way, agents may still
fail to display stability in their choice behaviour, for instance if their fundamental tastes
change. Insofar as revealed preference theory relies on a stability assumption it thus
remains fallible. Moreover, even if options are described in this way, agents may still
fail to abide by all the standard axioms at any one point in time. For instance, they
may still have cyclical preferences.21 And so the above rule for specification under ideal
circumstances does not make revealed preference theory infallible. However, it does rule
out all the problematic cases discussed in the last section.
The first rule is designed to avoid the problem of false beliefs as in the first wasabi case
— here the economist’s mistake is that her specification of the options is not consistent with
her friend’s beliefs about them. The economist should either describe the options in a way
19’Belief’ here should be understood in a permissive sense, as ascribable to even unsophisticated non-
human or artificial agents that register things about their environments. I take no stance here on the
special case where the agent’s relevant beliefs are mutually inconsistent.
20Various authors have proposed that rules for the specification of options should be preference-based,
in the sense that two options should be distinguished just in case the agent’s preferences distinguish them
(e.g. by the options being ranked differently against further options, or the agent having strict preferences
between them). See, e.g., Joyce (1999: 52) or Dreier (1996). In effect, what I am proposing here is such a
rule applied to a behavioural interpretation of preference.
21Indeed, this paper does not mean to offer a response to standard counter-examples to expected utility
theory. However, insofar as alternatives to expected utility theory, built on less restrictive axioms (such as
rank-dependent utility theories), have a better empirical fit with observed choice data, this paper can be
read as providing arguments in favour of a behavioural interpretation of those theories, and the empirical
methodology for predicting choice behaviour based on those theories. See, for instance, Harrison and Ross
(2018) for an application of revealed preference methodology in a rank-dependent utility framework.
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that is consistent with those beliefs, e.g. as “eating a delicious bite of avocado”, or refrain
from inferring a preference at all. One way an economist might achieve consistency of the
option specification with the agent’s beliefs is in offering either a very general, or a very
superficial description of the agent’s options – for instance, by describing the economist’s
friend’s wasabi-eating options as in the second and third cases above, that is, as “eating
food” or “eating a thick green paste” respectively. However, doing so would violate our
second rule, as we would be leaving out many factors that presumably make a difference
to the agent’s choice, such as the food’s taste.
The two rules also allow us to respond to a related worry that leads Guala (2019:
3-4), to reject the identification of preference and choice. He considers two agents each
deciding between the same two pizza restaurants. They each ‘prefer’ a different one, but
they go to the same restaurant, because one of them has a false belief about his ‘preferred’
restaurant being closed. Guala claims that in this case the two agents’ choices are the
same, but we should not conclude that their preferences are also the same. And so we
cannot identify preference and choice. Applying the theory of options presented here,
our reaction should be that their choices are in fact not the same: There is no way of
describing the options identically in both cases, while preserving consistency with each
agent’s beliefs and capturing everything relevant to their choice.
Economists are of course never in the ideal situation where they have full knowledge of
the agent’s hypothetical choice behaviours and beliefs. And in fact, if they were, revealed
preference methodology would be of much less use. Given economists’ actual epistemic
limitations, the above standards can only be approximated. In practice, what economists
should thus try to achieve is firstly, consistency with our best estimate of the agent’s
most relevant beliefs, that is, beliefs about features of the choice situation that we have
reason to believe affect her choice the most. In the wasabi case, if the economist has
good reason to believe that her friend cannot identify wasabi, and that, plausibly, this is
highly relevant to her choice, then she should not describe her friend’s option as “eating
a spoonful of wasabi”. The next section will look in greater detail at how this standard
is applied in practice, but note here that consulting non-choice evidence can be highly
relevant in applying this standard, especially when economists can’t make a good guess
about agents’ mental states.22
Secondly, given their limited knowledge of agents’ beliefs and choice behaviours,
22Note also that relevant false beliefs may be hard to spot even in the lab, as they may fail to show up
as choice reversal in the lab when a subject learns about her mistake, for instance out of embarrassment.
Part of the difficulty of applying this standard is distinguishing such a case – where failure to spot the false
belief will lead to false prediction of future choice behaviour, as the belief is choice relevant outside of the
lab – from a non-problematic case of stable choice not affected by false beliefs. This difficulty translates
into uncertainty whether what we find in the lab has external validity. Such doubts about external validity
are of course not unique to revealed preference methodology. The two rules described here acknowledge
that non-choice data, in particular about beliefs, may be relevant for dealing with such difficult cases.
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economists should strive to include a feature in the description of a choice problem when-
ever they have reason to believe that the agent’s belief in the presence or absence of
that feature significantly affects the agent’s choice behaviour in the kinds of contexts the
economists are interested in. Again, under normal circumstances, this will exclude de-
scribing the wasabi-eating option as “eating food” or “eating a thick green paste”, as
this excludes features of the options we know to affect choice. The last qualification to
contexts of interest ensures that economists do not have to worry, for instance, about
agents’ choice behaviours being radically different in radically different economic systems,
unless, of course, they are interested in studying the effects of the introduction of such
an alternative system. And so they can omit a full description of the current economic
background conditions in most applications.
I take the standards for the specification of choice options described here to ade-
quately deal with the problematic cases introduced in the last section. They help revealed
preference theorists represent choice behaviours with stable and consistent preference re-
lations, retaining the identification of preference and choice. Moreover, I will argue in
the next section that economic practice is already in line with these standards. They are
therefore not revisionary, but offered as a sympathetic reconstruction of actual practice.
These standards do concede that some appeal to mental states must be made in order
to get the specification of choice options right. In particular, economists must make sure
that the description of options is consistent with the agent’s relevant beliefs. However,
note that the standards I have proposed here are less demanding, in terms of the knowl-
edge of or assumptions about mental states they require, than those suggested by critics
of revealed preference theory. Consistency with the agent’s relevant beliefs is all that is
required in terms of direct appeal to mental states. We do not need to require that options
are described in the way in which agents conceive of them, or in a way that captures all of
their relevant desires. We only need to make sure we capture everything that significantly
affects choice behaviour.
My proposal is thus that revealed preference theorists can continue to think of pref-
erence as a mere convenient representation of choice, as long as they model agents as
choosing between options described in the partly mentalist way I have described. The
crucial question now is whether the partly mentalist theory of options I offered is consis-
tent with an interpretation of preference that is still recognizably behavioural.23 I believe
it is. Most importantly, with this theory of option description in hand, we can still think
of preference as choice, as going for, or picking one option over another – just as choice
between options described in a way that must take account of the agent’s relevant beliefs.
This is fundamentally different from preference as a conative attitude of one option over
23It may, of course, at the same time be consistent with a mentalist interpretation of preference – see in
particular my discussion of functionalism below. But my main purpose is to show that a charitable and
essentially behavioural interpretation of revealed preference theory is possible.
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another, as on the ordinary understanding of preference.
One might think now that we have simply exploited an ambiguity in the notion of
choice, which can be given a more behavioural reading (as bodily movements that bring
about some outcome), and a more mentalist one (e.g. as intentional choice) in its own
right.24 Perhaps we have just insisted on a thoroughly mentalist notion of choice, thereby
preserving the identification of preference and choice, but sacrificing what was distinctively
behavioural about revealed preference theory. Granting revealed preference theorists the
labels ‘behavioural interpretation of preference’ and reference to ‘choice behaviour’ would
then be misleading.
But the theory of options proposed here does not turn the notion of choice in revealed
preference theory into intentional choice, where an agent’s intentions are captured by the
description of the options she is choosing: The theory of options we have proposed does
not aim at capturing options as the agent herself conceives of them, or intends them to
come about. It merely requires consistency of the option description with what the agent
believes. While the option description we end up with may sometimes match the content
of an agent’s intentions, this needn’t be the case, and revealed preference theory, as I
sketched it, also allows us to capture unintentional choices – as long as these unintentional
choices are consistent with the EUT axioms.
As mere behaviour does not have an object in any straightforward way, but choice,
as it features in economists’ formal frameworks, does, economists were always in need of
some theory of option description when capturing behaviour in terms of choice. When
that theory of option description is ultimately geared towards a framework that helps
us to accurately capture and predict behaviour and nothing more, and is non-committal
about the mental causes of behaviour, I believe the resulting notion of choice deserves to
be called ‘behavioural’. And what aiming at fulfilling the two conditions specified above
allows revealed preference theorists to do is capture the behaviour of agents as consistently
responding to what they perceive or believe about their choice environments (where their
behaviour allows of such an analysis), which has proven very useful in predicting the
behaviours of many different kinds of agents, non-human or human.
Some functionalists, such as Dietrich and List (2016) may hold that we have nev-
ertheless characterized a concept of preference that plays the functional role of desire or
preference in the ordinary sense: That which combines with belief in order to explain
choice behaviour. In that case, the account I have offered would be consistent with a
functionalist kind of mentalism about preference that ascribes mental states in virtue of
this function. On my account, preference obviously does not explain choice in a folk psy-
chological way, given we have identified preference with patterns in choice, and choice
24See Clarke (2016: 201) on this distinction.
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is itself belief-dependent. But one might think it explains behaviour, when we think of
behaviour as the mere description of outward bodily movements.
I argue in detail elsewhere ([redacted]) that this kind of functionalism about preference
in decision theory (not functionalism in general) is misguided, because preference as we
have characterized it here does not combine with belief to explain choice behaviour in the
way desire and belief do in ordinary folk psychological explanations. So let me just point
out here that insofar as my aim is to show that a charitable (that is, neither incoherent nor
unmotivated) and still distinctly behavioural interpretation of revealed preference theory
is possible, the possibility of this kind of functionalism does not undermine my argument.
Revealed preference theory under my interpretation may be attractive even to those who
are not functionalists of this kind, and will thus not interpret preference as we have
characterized it mentalistically. Indeed, as we will see in section 6, revealed preference
theory is usually motivated explicitly in opposition to mentalism about preference, aiming
to black-box the mental causes of choice. Moreover, as we will see in the next section,
while economic practice is consistent with limited mentalism about options, it still avoids
ascription of mentalistic preference.
Guala (2019), rightly, I think, resists the functionalist interpretation of preference as
a conative mental state. However, he argues that preferences should be understood as
belief-dependent dispositions that play a characteristic functional role that makes them
distinctly non-behavioural. However, his reasons for insisting that preference should be
understood as non-behavioural do not apply to our account. One core reason, which
we have just seen illustrated in the pizza example, is that he takes only preference and
not choice to be mediated by beliefs.25 On my account, both preference and choice are
belief-dependent, but minimally enough to deserve the label ‘behavioural’. Moreover,
unlike folk psychological explanation, the main way in which Guala takes preferences to
be explanatory does not rely on us denying that preferences are essentially behavioural.
In particular, he thinks that preferences allow generalizations when the cause of choice
is multiply realizable. Behavioural generalizations can also serve such a function. The
following will show that preserving the identification of preference and choice in the way
I have argued for here is the more charitable reconstruction of economic practice, and
removes the need to distance ourselves from the revealed preference project.
25In fact, the only straightforward way of maintaining the distinction between choice and preference in
his example would be to suppose that there are different standards for the description of choice options
and the objects of preference. But that does not seem to fit economic practice.
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5 Mentalism about Options in Practice
On the account offered in the last section, at least one fallible inductive step is involved
when economists infer a preference from observing behaviour. Economists must come up
with a characterization of the agent’s options that is consistent with her relevant beliefs
about them. If economists fail to do so, they may wrongly ascribe preference. Moreover,
this fallible inference involves the economist making a judgement about the agent’s mental
states – about her beliefs about her options. However, while I think economists thus
cannot escape a partly mentalistic theory of options, I argued that this is compatible with
an essentially behavioural interpretation of preference. Below, I will argue that conceding
a theory of options that is mentalistic in the limited sense described here preserves the
main advantages economists have seen in revealed preference theory. For now, let me
highlight that this concession is by and large consistent with economic practice.
I will start by looking at revealed preference methodology in the narrow sense, which
uses choice data to attribute preferences to agents and then make predictions about un-
observed choice behaviour. When attributing preferences to agents on the basis of choice
data, beliefs play the most apparent role in getting the description of options right in choice
situations involving uncertainty.26 Revealed preference theory under risk and uncertainty
either starts by describing agents as choosing between lotteries, that is, probability distri-
butions over outcomes,27 or as choosing between acts, that is assignments of outcomes to
states of the world.28 In these applications, according to the theory of options sketched
in the last section, the specification of probabilities of outcomes, states of the world and
assignments of outcomes to the states of the world must be consistent with the agent’s
beliefs about the choice situation in order for the revealed preference approach to identify
stable and consistent preferences.
Interestingly, revealed preference theorists working on the theoretical foundations of
the theory under risk and uncertainty, at least, appear to be happy to accept this. Kim
(1996: 464), who applies revealed preference theory to the choice of lotteries, describes his
approach as follows: “[T]he uncertainty modeled in this paper is limited to the situation
where both the outside observer and the decision-maker agree on the probability distribu-
tions of the lotteries considered.” It is hard to see how agreement on probabilities, where
these are not themselves explicitly derived from choice behaviour, could be understood in
non-mentalistic terms. It seems we must think of it either as an agreement in degrees of
26Getting the description of options right is also going to be tricky, and a substantive part of the
analysis, in game theoretic applications of revealed preference methodology. However, revealed preference
methodology is much less commonly applied in game theoretic settings, despite the existence of relevant
representation theorems (see footnote 9 above).
27See, for instance, Green and Srivastava (1986), Border (1992) and Kim (1996).
28See, for instance, Bossert and Suzumura (2012) and Echenique and Saito (2015).
17
belief, or as agreement in judgement about objective probabilities. This phrasing also ac-
knowledges the kinds of problems we have discussed: The success of the approach depends
on economists accurately capturing how the options present themselves to the agent. More
generally, when probabilities are presupposed by a revealed preference theorist working
within the von Neumann-Morgenstern framework, probabilities are usually described to
be ‘known’. In the spirit of the above quotation, I propose this should be understood
either as saying that objective probabilities should be known to both the agent and the
economist,29 or that the economist independently knows the agent’s subjective probabili-
ties.30 Either way, assumptions about the agent’s beliefs are made. In other applications,
such as Green and Osband (1991), probabilities are treated as measuring epistemic states
that reasonably respond to evidence. However, crucially, all these authors still insist on a
behavioural interpretation of preference.
Empirical literature that aims to estimate utility or demand functions from choice
data mostly31 models consumption choices as choices under certainty: Agents are taken
to directly choose some outcome, or consumption bundle. And so reference to probabilistic
belief does not come up there. The problem that description of commodity bundles needs
to be consistent with agents’ beliefs about them is however still relevant here, and is
admittedly little discussed in the core revealed preference literature. I propose that one
major reason for this is that in the case of market commodities, the market to a large extent
defines commodities: It demarcates commodities from each other, and presents consumers
with a carefully curated package of information about the product. Since producers have
an interest in repeat business, the kinds of misunderstandings involved in our wasabi case
are going to be rare. And learning through repeat purchases is likely to quickly eliminate
such anomalies. Widespread misinformation about commodities is going to be most likely
in cases where commodities have long-term harmful effects that are either yet unknown or
hidden by producers. But in these kinds of circumstances, economists will often be in the
same epistemic situation as consumers. And if they are not, I submit that they would in
fact bring the appropriate caution to revealed preference approaches. No economist would
conclude, e.g., from data on cigarette consumption in the 1950s that consumers have a
revealed preference for carcinogenic substances.32
29Chambers and Echenique’s (2016: 114) textbook, for instance, understands probabilities within the
von Neumann-Morgenstern framework in this way: “There are times when probabilities can be thought
to be objective and known, or observable. This is the case, for example, when outcomes are randomized
according to some known physical device – such as a game in a casino, or a randomization device used by
an experimenter in the laboratory.”
30This seems to be the way in which Green and Srivastava (1986) think of their framework, as they
claim probabilities are both observable and subjective.
31The exception are empirical studies of the demand for insurance or betting behaviour. See, e.g., Jullien
and Salanie´ (2000), Cohen and Einav (2007), and Barseghyan et al. (2013).
32Cases where there are genuine doubts about the true nature of a product amongst consumers and
economists, as is the case, e.g. in markets for used cars as analysed in Akerlof’s (1970) famous model, are
usually analysed within the economics of information, which assumes a framework of uncertainty. As just
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In the literature on the valuation of goods that are not directly traded in markets,
such as environmental goods, discussions about “commodity definition” are, on the other
hand, very common. And indeed, part of what is acknowledged to make commodity
definition in this area difficult is that agents often lack information on how environmental
harms and benefits are brought about. One way in which revealed preference methods
are employed in this literature is in trying to infer the value of a good not directly traded
on the market from the market value of related market commodities. To take an example
from Boyd and Krupnick (2009), economists may want to infer the value of wetlands to the
inhabitants of an area from the premium paid for houses in the vicinity of the wetlands.
However, house buyers may not know of all the environmental benefits of the wetlands.
This is one of the reasons why Boyd and Krupnick argue that we may be able to infer from
the premium paid a revealed preference for proximity to open spaces, but not a revealed
preference for the abundance of wildlife and clean water. Or, in other words, supposing
that the description of the options house-buyers are choosing includes a description of
those environmental benefits would be a misspecification: This description of the options
is not consistent with the agents’ relevant beliefs.
Related empirical methods include the use of contingent valuation surveys, where
subjects are asked about what they would be willing to pay for various environmental
goods. In this literature, it is generally acknowledged that subjects must be given as
much information as possible about the environmental goods.33 Again, this seems to be
motivated by the thought that in order to legitimately elicit preferences over the options
under the description we are actually interested in, we must ensure that that description
of the options is consistent with the agents’ relevant beliefs.
According to the second part of my proposed rule for the specification of options,
economists should try to include in their description of options everything that makes a
significant difference to agents’ choice behaviour. Does this cohere with economic practice?
Ultimately, the core interest of revealed preference methodology is the determination of
demand functions and Engel curves for various commodities, which can then be used to
predict and explain market behaviours and guide policy-making. The question of the
appropriate description of outcomes, in this context, is the question of when commodities
should be explicitly distinguished from each other. Along the lines I just suggested,
the revealed preference theorist should make this decision by asking herself whether two
commodities are different in a way that may affect agents’ choice behaviour in the kinds
of contexts in which we aim to predict and explain, namely, whether market demand is
going to behave significantly differently for the two commodities. Indeed, these seem to be
discussed, in such a framework, options need to be explicitly described so as to capture agent’s beliefs about
the nature of the uncertainty they face. Note, however, that in Akerlof’s core model, there is ultimately
no doubt about the nature of the cars that are traded – they will all be bad.
33See, e.g., Carson (1998) on the valuation of tropical rainforests.
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exactly the kinds of considerations driving the ways in which commodities are described
in the empirical literature.
Many revealed preference studies utilize national expenditure surveys which generate
data on household expenditures on various commodity groups. Blundell et al. (2003),
for instance, use data from the British Family Expenditure Survey from 1974 to 1993,
grouped into 22 commodity groups, including beer, wine, spirits, leisure goods and leisure
services. The question of whether such categories are too coarse-grained is discussed
extensively in the empirical economics literature as the question of ‘disaggregation’.34
Disaggregation is generally taken to allow for more accurate forecasts when a commodity
group is disaggregated into smaller commodity groups for which consumer demand behaves
significantly differently. But there may be practical limitations to the extent to which we
can do so, and it is generally acknowledged that the desirable level of disaggregation
depends on the purpose of the exercise, that is, whether we wish to predict and explain
economy- or industry-wide phenomena, or rather movements within specific industries.35
Suppose, for instance, we grouped all alcoholic beverages together, and estimated that
share of expenditure spent on alcoholic beverages decreases with rising income. While
this may accurately predict industry-wide phenomena as incomes rise, the prediction will
not hold for all alcoholic beverages, with quality wines, spirits and craft brews potential
exceptions.
How do we know that consumer demand behaves significantly differently for two com-
modities? Speculation about consumers’ desires or mentalistic preferences may give us
some indication here. Intuitively, it makes sense that people’s demand for wine should re-
act differently to changes in price and income than consumer’s demand for beer. However,
decisions about the right level of disaggregation in revealed preference studies on consumer
demand are usually driven by more empirical considerations. For instance, there are many
studies suggesting that demand for beer, wine and spirits respectively behaves quite dif-
ferently in most countries.36 For some commodity groups, differential demand behaviour
may not be quite as intuitively obvious. For instance, it may be not as clear why demand
for leisure goods and leisure services should behave differently. Here, evidence on choice
behaviour will be especially helpful: Where the data has been disaggregated in the past,
were significant differences found? If so, and unless we have good reason to think that
conditions are different in the context of a present study, we have good reason to treat
two commodities as different.
Of course, evidence of people’s mental states, for instance from surveys or neuroeco-
nomics, may also be helpful in determining what features of commodities make a difference
34For an edited volume dedicated to the issue, see Barker and Pesaran (1990).
35See, e.g., Barker and Pesaran’s introduction in Barker and Pesaran (1990).
36See Fogarty (2010) for a review of the literature.
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to consumption choices. In fact, more generally, non-choice evidence about agents’ mental
states is not irrelevant to revealed preference theory as I characterize it here. For one, as
noted above, non-choice evidence of belief may be relevant in getting the description of
options right. However, it is important to note that for the revealed preference theorist,
mentalist evidence that agents desire certain features of options is less direct evidence
than evidence of differential choice behaviour. It requires us to not only make the fal-
lible inference from one context to another, but also to make the fallible inference from
the presence of a desire relating to some feature of agents’ options to differential choice
behaviour. And so where there is ample choice evidence available, this will be the more
informative evidence for the revealed preference theorist.
I have argued that, in order to identify an at least potentially stable and consistent
preference relation from an agent’s choice behaviour, economists must describe the options
an agent is facing in a way that is consistent with her beliefs. Moreover, they must aim to
include in the description of options any factors that they have reason to believe signifi-
cantly affect the agent’s choice behaviour in the contexts of interest. This means a fallible
inductive step is involved in inferring preferences from choice behaviour, as economists
may fail to correctly characterize the agent’s options. The success of this inference relies,
amongst other things, on economists correctly identifying the agent’s beliefs. What the
foregoing examples of economic practice show, I think, is that economists working within
the revealed preference framework are not in principle opposed to appealing to mental
states in precisely this way. Indeed, in the areas where they are most relevant to get-
ting the analysis right – preferences over non-market goods, and choice under uncertainty
– beliefs are explicitly discussed. Importantly, however, none of this is taken by these
economists to show that preferences themselves aren’t to be understood behaviourally,
and rightly so. We can combine a partly mentalistic theory of options of the kind I have
described here with a behavioural interpretation of preference.
Revealed preference theorists typically take the behavioural interpretation of prefer-
ence to apply more comprehensively than revealed preference methodology. In particular,
preferences as they feature in theoretical economic models can also be given a behavioural
interpretation. As noted above, the claim here is that positing expected utility maximiz-
ing agents in theoretical economic models amounts to positing theoretical entities that
choose in a certain way. Drawing on the theory of options developed in the last section,
now we can add that the choice of description of the options these theoretical entities are
choosing between captures both what we take these theoretical entities to believe about
their environments, and what is relevant to their choice. And so, while according to the
behavioural interpretation, these models involve no assumptions about conative mental
states like preference in the ordinary sense, they often do involve commitments about be-
liefs.37 When options are described in a way that implies that agents in these models have
37In some parts of economics, these commitments can indeed be quite strong, for instance when game
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(true) beliefs that real agents typically don’t, this is a potentially worrying disanalogy
between model and real world. In fact, there is great controversy over assumptions of
perfect information or common knowledge of rationality as they are implemented in many
economic models. If my analysis is correct, revealed preference theorists can join in this
criticism, as it pertains to the minimal mentalism they must grant. The only criticism
they will cast off as misguided is the kind of criticism that complains that real agents
don’t have conative mental states corresponding to the preferences and utilities featuring
in these models. And they are arguably right to cast this off as misguided.38
The charge against revealed preference theory considered in this paper is that pref-
erence attribution is inextricably linked to the attribution of mental states, in particular
beliefs, and that this makes revealed preference theory incoherent or unmotivated. By
showing that the appeal to mental states required is quite minimal and consistent with
actual practice in revealed preference methodology, I have argued that revealed preference
theory is not incoherent. The next section will argue that acknowledging this minimal
mentalism does not make revealed preference theory unmotivated either.
6 The Appeal of Revealed Preference Theory
As we have seen, a limited appeal to mental states along the lines of the account I have
presented is recognized to be necessary in practice by economists working within the
revealed preference framework, rhetoric about “mindless economics” notwithstanding.39
Still, critics of revealed preference theory might hold that this recognition undermines the
key motivations for revealed preference theory. For instance, having noted the problem
that choice reveals preference only once we have identified what the objects of choice are,
and that verbal communication would be one natural way of finding out what the objects of
choice are, Bradley (2017: 60) asks, “if recourse must be had to verbal communication then
why not simply ask the subjects what they prefer and dispense with the pretence of purely
behavioural evidence?” More generally, if the only motivation for revealed preference was
supposed to be strict behaviourism, that is, a general rejection of non-behavioural evidence
theoretic solution concepts are justified in terms of the expected utility maximization of each agent, as
in epistemic game theory. Here, the description of options will have to be consistent with the agent’s
beliefs about other players’ choices, which will depend on their strategic reasoning. While the behavioural
interpretation of preference can be extended to cover epistemic game theory in this way, the advantages
of the revealed preference approach discussed below, in terms of being less committal about the mental
causes of choice, will be less prominent here.
38Clarke’s (2016) argument is instructive here.
39See Gul and Pesendorfer (2008) as an example of this rhetoric. That Gul and Pesendorfer’s rhetoric
does not do full justice to economic practice is also evidenced by the fact that Chambers and Echenique
(2016: xv), in the first comprehensive textbook for revealed preference theory, declare in their preface that
revealed preference theory does not preclude the use of data other than choice data.
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and the presupposition of mental states not reducible to choice behaviour, then revealed
preference theory now looks to be unmotivated. If the key goal was to get rid of appeal
to mental states altogether, then what we have shown is that this goal is unattainable.
In this section, I aim to show that coupling a partly mentalistic theory of options with
a behavioural interpretation of preference still guarantees most of the core advantages
economists have attributed to revealed preference theory over more mentalistic views.
The originators of revealed preference theory, most prominently Paul Samuelson, as
well as, for instance, Little (1949), were writing in the heyday of logical positivism and
behaviourism, and no doubt influenced by those intellectual currents. Still, it is not entirely
clear that even those early revealed preference theorists were thorough-going behaviourists.
Ross (2011), for instance, is sceptical, arguing that the goal for early revealed preference
theorists was to continue with a process of eliminating psychological foundations from
economics that started earlier than behaviourism. Apart from scepticism about the reality
and empirical measurability of mentalistic notions of utility and preference specifically
(and not necessarily mental state attribution in general), this was motivated by a desire to
study aggregate economic dynamics and to be able to “ignore idiosyncrasies of individual
consumers.” (221)
Later defences of revealed preference theory echo several of the motivations that
were driving early revealed preference theorists, without presupposing thorough-going
behaviourism or positivism. I take there to be four core motivations of contemporary
revealed preference theory. The first three are advantages that arise from black-boxing, as
far as possible, the mental attitudes that cause choices. They apply to revealed preference
methodology narrowly construed, as well as to the behavioural interpretation of preference
in other parts of positive economics. This black-boxing is attractive, first, because it
allows economists to retain a clearer disciplinary boundary to psychology and related
disciplines. This desire is apparent in the vigour in which Gul and Pesendorfer (2008), for
instance, fend off criticism of standard economic theory from psychology and neuroscience.
Second, black-boxing is attractive in the face of scepticism about the specific psychological
processes that would be presupposed under more mentalistic interpretations of expected
utility theory. And third, even if we weren’t sceptical about those psychological processes
correctly describing at least some agents, black-boxing can help expected utility theory
achieve greater generality, as it could apply even to agents who make decisions differently.
In fact, it has no problem extending the analysis to choices driven by addiction, behavioural
cues or subliminal advertising, or even the behaviour of non-human animals, as has in fact
been done.40 All we need for the theory to be fruitfully applied is that agents respond
40See Becker and Murphy (1988) on “rational addiction”, and Kagel et al. (1995) for applications to
non-human animals. Angner (ming) reviews further such applications of the theory to the decision-making
of less than fully rational and reflective agents.
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consistently to what they believe or register about their environment.41
The final core motivation of contemporary revealed preference theory, focused more on
revealed preference methodology more narrowly construed, is to establish, in some sense,
a ‘tight connection’ between the main data available to economists, namely data about
market choices and contingent choice data (where consumers are asked to report how they
would choose under various hypothetical circumstances), and the theoretical constructs of
their theories. That is, it is taken to be desirable to infer preference from choice as directly
as possible, making as few auxiliary assumptions as possible. Again, this is a core theme
of Gul and Pesendorfer’s (2008) defence of revealed preference theory, and is echoed in
Chambers and Echenique’s (2016) textbook on revealed preference theory, who claim that
the point of revealed preference theory is to establish what economic models say about
economic data, and in particular choice data. While positivists traditionally thought that
only concepts defined in terms of measurement operations are meaningful, we can also
give the concern for a tight connection between preference and choice data an empiricist
reading: It is taken to be desirable to eliminate a fallible inductive step about mental
states when using choice data to predict and explain market movements. This seems to
me to be more uncontroversially an advantage of revealed preference methodology.
Importantly for us, none of these four core motivations are crucially undermined by
the acknowledgement of a partly mentalistic theory of options. The mentalistic theory
of options requires economists to make assumptions about agents’ beliefs. While this is
not consistent with strict behaviourism, it is consistent with black-boxing most of the
motivating factors that bring about choice. It does not require us, for instance, to take
a stance on whether choices are ultimately caused by expectation of hedonic utility, by
an all-things-considered judgement of choice-worthiness, by impulses triggered by our
environment, or by application of some rule of thumb. All we need to take a stance on
is the agent’s beliefs about her options. Doing so does not require integrating economics
with full psychological theories of how agents make choices, and thus allows a greater
disciplinary separation. It is consistent with scepticism about mentalistic notions of utility
and preference playing a role in what causes choice. And it preserves the generality of the
theory that allows it to capture choice behaviour brought about by a variety of different
psychological mechanisms.42
41In the first instance, I here have in mind the generality of the revealed preference and expected utility
frameworks: The frameworks can be used to analyze the choice behaviours of many different kinds of
agents, who make choices in different ways. This would be an advantage even if the specific preferences
we ascribe to different kinds of agents are all very idiosyncratic, because their choice behaviours look very
different. Where they are not, and there are broad similarities in the choice behaviours of different agents,
there is also the generality we get from ascribing the same preferences to many different kinds of agents.
I take it this is the explanatory advantage Guala sees in preference ascriptions when their causal basis is
multiply realized. Also see Ross (2011) on the advantages of this kind of generality.
42This is not to say that it might not be desirable to open the black box in some cases, in particular
when there are systematic violations of the theory. In fact, this is a core motivation behind behavioural
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What about the fourth core motivation? Even with a partly mentalistic theory of
options, revealed preference theory preserves a tight connection between the data available
to economists and their theoretical constructs. Granted, acknowledging a mentalistic
theory of options means that preferences cannot be directly inferred from observation of
choice behaviour, as economists must make fallible assumptions about beliefs. However,
the inductive step from observation of behaviour to the existence of a preference is still
safer under revealed preference theory than it is on most mentalist accounts. On the
account presented here, the economist may make a mistake in her characterization of
the agent’s options. But if she doesn’t, her inference from observed choice behaviour to
preference is going to be correct. On the alternative picture, on the other hand, economists
not only have to get the characterization of the choice problem right. They also make an
inference from choice to whatever mental attitude preference is interpreted to be. Unless
we subscribe to the functionalist kind of mentalism about preference described above
(which I believe to be misguided), this further inference is going to be fallible.
7 Conclusion
By characterizing revealed preference theory as tied to a strict kind of (global or local) be-
haviourism, and then showing this behaviourism to be untenable, critics have been unchar-
itable towards revealed preference theory. Commitment to a behavioural interpretation of
preference, which identifies preference with choice, is central to revealed preference theory.
Beyond that, revealed preference theory is characterized by a methodological programme
that aims to (i) use past choice data to ascribe preferences and utilities to agents, (ii) use
these preference and utility ascriptions to make predictions about unobserved choices, and
(iii) lay the formal foundations for the mapping of choice behaviour to preference. Under
a behavioural interpretation of preference, this methodological programme has the advan-
tage of largely black-boxing the causes of choice, thereby keeping a clearer disciplinary
boundary to the psychological sciences, accommodating scepticism about mentalistic no-
tions of utility and preference, and preserving greater generality of the theory. Moreover,
it eliminates fallible inductive steps about agents’ mental states when making predictions
about future choice behaviour on the basis of past choice behaviour.
This paper has shown that revealed preference theory must and does take some mental
states, namely beliefs, into account. However, I have argued that the extent to which it
has to do so is fairly limited: It is restricted to taking beliefs into account in the description
of the options an agent is choosing between. Such a partly mentalistic theory of options
is not only consistent with retaining a behavioural interpretation of preference. Economic
practice within the revealed preference framework is also by and large consistent with
economics.
25
pairing a partly mentalistic interpretation of options with a behavioural interpretation
of preference. Moreover, the main motivations economists have cited for the behavioural
interpretation of preference and revealed preference methodology are not undermined by
adopting a partly mentalistic theory of options.
Of course, there may be reasons to question the standard motivations for revealed
preference theory I have presented here. Moreover, there may be independent reasons to
favour a mentalistic interpretation of preference over a behavioural one. For instance, one
might think that, only under a mentalistic interpretation of preference can we view ex-
pected utility theory as providing rationalizing or folk-psychological kinds of explanations,
or as being action-guiding.43 I believe that these arguments ultimately fail to provide a
justification for adopting a mentalistic interpretation of preference, and that the ability
to black-box multifarious psychological processes, at least, is a good reason to favour the
behavioural interpretation of preference. This is the subject of a separate paper. Here,
I aimed to delineate more clearly where and how revealed preference theorists must, and
indeed do, appeal to mental states, and moreover show that revealed preference theory
should not be dismissed on the grounds that doing so renders the project incoherent or
unmotivated.
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